The project is pre-alpha and unreleased. There are no supported versions yet, and no released version has received a security audit.
Please report security issues privately rather than opening a public issue.
Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security -> Report a vulnerability). If that is unavailable, open a public issue containing only the general nature of the problem and no exploit details, then wait for a maintainer to reach out.
Please do not open a public issue containing working exploit code.
Include, where you can:
- What the issue is and its impact
- Steps to reproduce, ideally on a throwaway VM
- The version or commit hash
- Your OS build
Expect an acknowledgement within a few days. Fixes land on main first and are
disclosed publicly after release.
This is a local, single-user desktop tool. It is not a network service, and it does not listen on any port. That shapes what actually matters.
File Juggler moves, renames, copies and deletes files using your own Windows permissions, automatically, while running in the background. That is the product. It has no sandbox and no confinement - by design, because a file organizer that cannot reach your files would be useless.
The consequence: a malicious or careless rule is destructive. Rules are
configured by you and stored in config/. Anything that can write to that file
can make the daemon move or delete your data on the next event.
| Risk | Status |
|---|---|
A malformed or hostile config/ causing destructive unintended actions |
Mitigated by full validation before reload, dry-run, undo journal, Recycle Bin deletes |
| Symlink / junction traversal causing files outside the monitored tree to be touched | Reparse points are filtered; being hardened further |
Path traversal via rule fields (.. segments, absolute paths in into) |
Being hardened - see below |
| TOCTOU between a condition evaluating and the action executing | Being hardened |
| Unbounded resource use from a crafted config | Being hardened |
Run command action executing attacker-controlled arguments |
Being hardened - commands must come from a named allowlist, not raw config |
| Log files exposing filesystem layout | Logs contain paths and are local-only; config/ is excluded from version control |
config/contains real filesystem paths - usernames, folder structure, sometimes enough to map a disk. It is git-ignored. Do not paste it into a public issue.juggler.exe doctoroutput is designed to be safe to share; prefer that.- The undo journal records every move with full source and destination paths, and is a complete history of what the tool did to your disk. Treat it as sensitive. It lives in your local app data directory and is never uploaded.
- Logs contain paths and error text, same handling as the journal.
File Juggler has no telemetry, no analytics, and no network calls of any kind. It cannot, by design. If you ever see it attempting a network connection, that is a serious bug - please report it.
The project publishes no binaries yet. When it does:
- Verify release checksums published alongside the release
- Release CI signs artifacts; prefer signed releases
- Review
config/before loading it, exactly as you would a shell script
- Running File Juggler on a machine where you are not the administrator and expect filesystem isolation. There is none.
- Compensating for a deliberately malicious
Run commandrule. That feature is being hardened to an allowlist, but a local administrator can always run code directly.